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The State of American Federalism, 
2001-2002: 
Resilience in Response to Crisis 
Dale A. Krane 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
The past year has been one of rl?fJeated shocks to government and the larger society. Terrorist attacks 
in New York City and Washington, D. C., the burst of the dot. com bubble in the stock market, a wave of 
corporate scandals, and a slowdown in the economy posed severe problems for officials of all governments 
in the federal system. The combined effects of the war on terrorism and the economic turmoil forced 
federal policymakers to create new agencies and to enact new policies. State and local governments also 
responded to the multiple shocks with a variety of initiatives, often ind!?flendent of Washington. Instead 
of a move toward centralization that might have been predicted as a consequence of the serious shocks, all 
elements of the American federal system demonstrated a capacity and energy to marshal resources in a 
time of urgency. 
On 11 September 2001, four commercial airliners were hijacked by 
terrorists. Within an hour, two planes were deliberately crashed into each 
of the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Soon afterward, 
a third plane was rammed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the 
fourth was forced down in Pennsylvania by the actions of the passengers. 
The surprise attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center resulted 
in the tragic loss of approximately 3,000 lives. Without warning, these events 
thrust the United States of America into the first war of the twenty-first 
century, not a traditional conflict between nation-states, but a conflict with a 
non-state organization known as Al-Qaeda. Just as on 7 December 1941, 
when a surprise attack killed 2,400 people at Pearl Harbor, the nation turned 
to the president, the Congress, and the rest of the federal government to 
protect the country from further assaults and to punish those responsible. 
It is difficult to make any country or community completely secure, but 
the task is especially daunting in a country as large, as free, and as open as 
the United States} The task of homeland security is further complicated 
by the country's democratic procedures for making public policy decisions 
and its federal arrangements for sharing power and authority across multiple 
orders of government. Unitary governments reputedly have an advantage 
in the speed at which policy is decided and in their ability to command and 
direct actions toward a goal. By contrast, the American federal union with 
its more than 87,000 jurisdictions creates a challenge to the development 
of a unified strategy and its effective implementation. Nevertheless, the 
'Michael E. O'Hanlon, et al., Protecting The American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. I. 
general expectation is that the federal government will mobilize the nation's 
resources in response to a major crisis or threat. The natural "rally around 
the flag" response that occurs every time the nation has been attacked gives 
the president and the Congress great discretion to chart a course of action 
and to command compliance with the national strategy. 
The federal government immediately initiated actions at home and 
abroad to counter the threat of new terrorist attacks and to prevent future 
ones. An Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was created, and President 
George W. Bush appointed former Republican Governor Thomas Ridge of 
Pennsylvania as its director. The office's mission was to develop a 
comprehensive strategy for homeland security to ( 1) prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, (2) reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, 
and (3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.2 As 
actions to secure the home front proceeded, the armed forces were 
mobilized and sent to Afghanistan to dislodge the ruling Taliban regime, 
which had provided a base of operations for Al-Qaeda. The military 
succeeded in swiftly driving out the Taliban forces, and an interim 
government was established with United Nations support. 
Through the year as these events unfolded, two other serious problems 
demanded attention by the federal government. First, the economy slowed 
considerably as it readjusted to the collapse of the so-called "new economy" 
based on information technology. The burst of the dot.com bubble had 
begun in 2001 and manifested itself in the sudden end of a large number 
of venture enterprises and the consequent crash in the value of technology 
stocks. The 11 September attacks further slowed the economy as thousands 
of employees, especially in the New York City area, lost their jobs, even if 
only temporarily. In addition, fear of flying after the attacks prompted 
many to avoid travel by plane, and the airline industry went into a tailspin. 
The reluctance to fly also affected adversely areas of the country in which 
tourism is a principal part of the state or local economy. All of these events 
brought the nation's economy to a recession, something the country had 
not experienced since the early 1990s. 
Second, a series of corporate scandals occurred suddenly, and in quick 
succession several large energy and telecommunications companies went 
bankrupt. The daily news was filled with revelations that senior executives 
engaged in misleading accounting practices and financial artifices, and that 
these machinations were aided and abetted by certified public accounting 
firms and well-regarded Wall Street financial houses. In short order, the 
stock market plummeted to levels that had not been seen in over five years, 
the value of many personal and public pension funds dropped steeply, and 
public trust in Wall Street and in corporate leaders was replaced by 
resentment and demands for prompt punishment. 
'The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Executive Summary, 16 July 2002, 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07. 
The combination of the war on terrorism and the economic upheaval 
put the locus of decision-making in the nation's capital. Federal 
policymakers rushed to meet these problems with new agencies and policies 
such as the Office of Homeland Security, the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), 
the Transportation Security Administration (Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, P.L. 107-71), and the Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act (P.L. 107-204). One might have expected state 
and local governments to have been eclipsed by these unusual events and 
by the extensive set of actions taken by federal officials. To respond to 
these problems of national and international scale, a new level of 
centralization could easily be predicted; after all, the United States had 
gone through periods of centralization in similar crises in the past-the two 
world wars, the Great Depression, and the economic and social turmoil of 
the 1960s. Although the nation's structure of government, and even its 
very way of life, suffered several serious shocks this past year, the response 
and stability of the American federal system has been remarkable. Not 
only did the federal government work to ameliorate the crises, state and 
local governments did so as well. Furthermore, state and local governments 
took the initiative in several issue areas without waiting for decisions by 
Washington. Rather than a move toward centralization, this past year in 
American federalism has seen vigorous action by all governments, and a 
new realization that without the participation of state and local governments, 
no strategy requiring nationwide efforts will succeed. 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
To manage the war against Al-Qaeda and other potential terrorist threats, 
President Bush established the Homeland Security Council and the Office 
of Homeland Security. The council's charge is to advise the president on 
security matters, to develop a comprehensive national strategy to protect 
against attacks, and to coordinate federal, state, and local counter-terrorism 
efforts. The Homeland Security Council is composed of the president; the 
vice-president; the attorney general; the secretaries of Treasury, Defense, 
Health and Human Services, and Transportation; the directors of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency; the assistant to the president for homeland 
security; and other Cabinet officers and federal officials the president may 
designate to attend. Conspicuously absent from the council are 
representatives of state and local government. The Office of Homeland 
Security (OHS) prepared and delivered by mid:July 2002 The First National 
Strategy for Homeland Security which identified six critical mission areas: ( 1) 
intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) 
domestic counter terrorism, ( 4) protecting critical infrastructure, (5) 
defending against catastrophic terrorism, and (6) emergency preparedness 
and response.3 OHS was located in the Executive Office of the President, 
and relied primarily on presidential authority in order to organize and 
coordinate the 100-plus federal entities with responsibilities related to 
homeland security. To create a unified command, President Bush proposed 
legislation to convert OHS to a Cabinet department. The proposal would 
transfer a number of federal agencies and offices from their existing 
organizational locations to the new department. Among the units proposed 
for transfer are the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (including the Border Patrol), the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service, and the newly created Transportation Security 
Administration. The amalgamation of several disparate agencies and offices 
"would unify authority over maJor Federal security operations related to 
our borders, territorial waters, and transportation systems ... As a result, the 
Department would have sole responsibility for managing entry into the 
United States and protecting our transportation infrastructure."4 Bush also 
submitted a request for approximately $38 billion. As of August 2002, 
congressional approval of the new department had not been obtained. 
An effective strategy to protect the nation against new attacks is contingent 
on the identification of tasks, the assignment of responsibilities, the 
determination of the means of protection, the mobilization of resources, 
including paying for new security measures, and the coordination of actions. 
While the National Strategy for Homeland Security acknowledges that "state 
and local governments have critical roles to play in homeland security," 
the primary responsibility of state and local governments mentioned in the 
document is that of "funding, preparing, and operating the emergency 
services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack." The National 
Strategy views all manmade and natural disasters as local events, and local 
units are the "first responders" to these events. The National Strategy expressly 
states that the new department " ... cannot and will not create separate and 
specialized coordinating bodies for every functional area of government. 
To do so would merely replicate the stovepiped system that exists today and 
would defeat a main purpose of creating a new Department."5 
To assist state and local governments in their emergency response role, 
Bush's 2003 budget proposed a $3.5 billion First Responder State/Local 
Preparedness Grant. The new funds would be allocated in thirds to improve 
communications, direct dollars to state and local first response units, and 
implement training, planning, technical assistance, and administration. 
Twenty-five percent of the grant monies would be distributed to states using 
a 75-25 match rate. The other 75 percent of the funds would be distributed 
to localities by state governments. Presumably, the grant monies targeted 
for discretionary spending (25 percent) by the state governments would 
'See National Strat'gy for Homeland Security. 
4President George W. Bush, Message to tlu! Congr,.ss oftlu! United State.s (18 June 2002). 
'National Strat'gy for Homeland Serurit)', p. 13. 
assist states to cover the costs of the specific state government activities 
mentioned in the National Strategy: coordinate suggested minimum standards 
for state driver's licenses, enhance market capacity for terrorism insurance, 
train for prevention of cyber attacks, suppress money laundering, ensure 
continuity of the judiciary, and review quarantine authorities.6 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in FY2002 
announced $1.1 billion in Public Health Grants for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness. States are allowed to begin spending 20 percent of their 
total allocation immediately; the remaining 80 percent will become available 
after HHS has approved a state's bioterrorism plan. Each state is required 
to devise a plan as to how it will respond to a bioterrorism event, contain 
outbreaks of infectious diseases, and strengthen its public health capacities 
by no later than 15 April 2003. 7 
The proposed Department of Homeland Security builds on an 
increasingly interconnected relationship between the federal, state, and 
local governments that has evolved since the early 1950s when the Office of 
Civil Defense (OCD) was established. Then the threat was nuclear warfare, 
and the OCD distributed substantial funds to local governments to train 
personnel and to build emergency operations centers that could withstand 
the blast effects of nuclear weapons. During the 1960s, the Department of 
Justice distributed law-enforcement assistance grants to states and localities 
to improve their capacity to fight crime and to quell urban riots.8 The 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288) defined 
the federal government's basic pre-9/11 role in responding to major disasters 
that are beyond the response capacity of state and local governments. After 
a disaster is declared, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
can reimburse state and local governments for 75 to 100 percent of eligible 
costs related to response and recovery.9 
In the aftermath of the 1995 nerve-gas attack on a Tokyo subway station 
and the Oklahoma City bombing the same year, President Bill Clinton issued 
a presidential decision directive (No. 39) listing the responsibilities of 
federal agencies for combating terrorism. Congress soon passed the Defense 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 for the purpose of 
providing equipment and training to state and local emergency response 
units. 10 In 1997, Congress set up the Domestic Preparedness Program 
through which six federal agencies work with state governments and the 
6 Spedal Report: Stale Funding for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: National Association of State Budget 
Officers, 7 March 2002). 
'Ibid. 
'Frances Winslow, "9/ll and Federalism: Local Government and Civil Defense," ASPA Column Online, 
29 March 2002, Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration. 
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating TeTTorism: lnti!Tgovemmental Coopi!Talion in the Droelopment 
of a National Strategy to Enhance Stale and Local Preparedness, Statement of Patricia A. Dolan, Director, Strategic 
Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and 
Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, (2 April 
2002), GA0-02-550T. 
10Ibid. 
largest c1t1es in the country to prepare for terrorist eventsY The 
establishment of the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001 and the 
Transportation Security Administration in 2002 built upon this incremental 
growth in the intergovernmental capacity to prepare for and respond to 
disasters and terrorism. It should be pointed out, however, that the new 
Department of Homeland Security, once it is established, will be more than 
an incremental step because it "would constitute the largest reorganization 
of the federal government in fifty years." 12 
The current campaign to improve the nation's ability to protect against 
and respond to terrorist attacks exhibits the implementation problems 
typical of most new public programs. 13 Confusion about who should protect 
what was evident in the first months after the September 2001 attacks. 
Sentries were posted on the cliffs above the Hudson River, newly deputized 
air marshals were posted aboard some passenger flights, sea marshals were 
dispatched to board ships entering ports, and NATO pilots flew patrols 
over the national capital. Governors and mayors bore the direct 
responsibility for posting the National Guard, deciding which parts of the 
nation's infrastructure-public and private-would be protected, and for 
inspecting persons and vehicles in transit. 
As OHS released a series of alerts, state and local officials began to raise 
questions about their responsibilities and the availability of resources in 
support of state and local actions. Governor Angus King of Maine spoke 
for many of his colleagues when he stated that: "We just aren't financially 
geared up for this level of what really is national defense expenditure ... the 
question is where do you stop with providing security?" Governor Gary 
Johnson of New Mexico answered by resisting the pressure from OHS for 
more state commitment to protecting a long list of possible targets. 
Governor King also raised the issue of precedence related to public 
protection for some private facilities but not for others: " .. .ifyou say yes to 
one, how do you say no to the next and the next?"14 
Governors and mayors also complained about inadequate information 
sharing or the plain absence of relevant information. The Federal Bureau 
oflnvestigation (FBI) took more than a month to set up its post-September 
11 national crime database and to post detailed information that local and 
state police could use as they carried out routine activities such as traffic 
stops. Sometimes different federal agencies sent conflicting messages to 
the same state or local office, as exemplified by different directives from 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and from FEMA about nuclear power 
plants. In some cases, governors and mayors learned about potential threats 
"Winslow, "9/11 and Federalism: Local Government and Civil Defense." 
"Ivo H. Daadler, et al., Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, July 2002), p. i. 
"See, for example, Edward T. Jennings, Jr. and Dale Krane, "A New Initiative for an Established 
Program, • From Nation To States: The Small Cities Community Development Block Grant Program, eds. Edward T. 
Jennings, Jr., et al. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 1-21. 
"Pam Belluck and Timothy Egan, "Cities and States Say Confusion and Costs Hamper Security Drive, • 
New York Times, 10 December 2001 (Netscape version). 
from newscasts, instead of from OHS. Federal investigative agencies 
required mayors and other state and local officials to fill out lengthy 
information forms in order to gain clearance before the federal agencies 
would share information. 15 In other cases, local officials could not obtain 
necessary information about emergency preparedness because federal 
officials did not return phone calls. 16 
The most serious implementation difficulty was financial. Costs of 
response were immediate. Major cities such as Boston spent over $100,000 
per week on overtime pay for police. Baltimore spent $2.6 million for 
security in one month. Security expenditures for Baltimore from 11 
September to the end of 2001 were projected to be almost $16 million, 
while Dallas projected $6 million and New Orleans, $10 million_I' Cost 
figures for one-time and continued security expenses are still being 
calculated, but initial estimates even for a small state like Maine are 
enormous-one-time costs estimated to be $31 million. In the FY 2002 federal 
budget, the states were provided with $1.1 billion from HHS through the 
bioterrorism preparedness grants. In the proposed FY 2003 budget, only 
$3.5 billion out of the $38 billion was targeted for localities as part of the 
First Responder grant. The total for all homeland security is less than the 
new funds ($47 billion) allocated to DOD. The current state government 
fiscal crisis compounds the burden of providing security. 
One of the justifications for the new Department of Homeland Security 
(HS) is that it will reduce fragmentation in the federal government's 
organization, and thus improve overall coordination of security efforts. 
However, critics of the administration's proposed organizational structure 
point to several shortcomings, among which is the disjunct between the 
priorities of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the structure of 
HS. 18 Once the department is established, its new initiatives will have to 
avoid a "one-size-fits-all" approach to building intergovernmental and 
intersectoral partnerships. Patricia A. Dalton, Director, Strategic Issues, 
U.S. General Accounting Office in testimony to the U.S. House of 
Representatives cautioned that: "Achieving national preparedness and 
response goals hinges on the federal government's ability to form effective 
partnerships with nonfederal entities. Therefore, federal initiatives should 
be conceived as national, not federal in nature. Decision makers have to 
balance the national interest of prevention and preparedness with the 
unique needs and interests oflocal communities."19 At the same time, federal 
15lbid. 
'':Jodi Wilgoren, "At One of 1,000 Front Lines in U.S., Local Officials Try to Plan for War," New York 
Times, 19 June 2002 (Netscape version). 
"Pietro S. Nivola, "Reflections on Homeland Security and American Federalism," Working Paper 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 13 May 2002). 
"Daadler, et. al, Assessing the Department of Homeland Security, p. iv. 
19U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 
Success, Statement of Patricia A. Dalton, Director, Strategic Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives, (20 August 2002), GA0-02-1011T, p. 10. 
decision-makers face certain risks as they construct intergovernmental and 
intersectoral partnerships. The history of federal grants contains numerous 
examples where state and local government interests diverged from federal 
policy goals. One of the most common grant "games" especially familiar to 
students of fiscal federalism is the substitution of federal dollars for state and 
local monies. Another grant "game" is the diversion of federal dollars to 
alternative activities preferred by state and local entities.2° From the state and 
local perspective, new grants and programs in support of homeland security 
can become new sources of unfunded mandates and federal preemptions.21 
While much attention has been focused on state and local governments 
as "first responders," too little attention has been given to their extensive 
experience in planning and programming in areas directly related to 
homeland security. Simply put, state and local governments have long 
performed many of the primary functions on which an effective national 
strategy of homeland security will rest. State and local governments have 
not sat still since 11 September 2001. In the past year, at least 27 states have 
updated their criminal codes in regard to terrorism, 11 states have added 
the death penalty as punishment for terrorist acts, and several states have 
raised their penalties for the use of "hoax weapons." Other state legal 
changes include expansions of wire tapping and other forms of interception 
of communications and information exchange.22 Many local governments 
are restructuring their relationships within a regional area to improve 
coordination, response, and resource sharing. For example, the City of 
New Orleans and its four surrounding parishes have set up the Metropolitan 
Safety, Security, and Anti-Terrorism Task Force. In King County, Washington, 
a new regional disaster plan coordinates across 16 cities, 15 fire districts, 21 
water and sewer districts, 12 school districts, and includes private sector 
representatives. The Front Range Emergency Medical Service and Trauma 
Advisory Council pulls together all hospitals and rescue units in the six-
county metropolitan area of Denver, Colorado.23 The continuing efforts to 
develop homeland security plans and programs will be an important test of 
intergovernmental collaboration in the immediate future. Will the pervasive 
presence of potential threats prompt officials at all levels of American 
government to put aside personal and institutional interests, or will these 
efforts exhibit the "gamesmanship" that has been common to inter-
governmental relations? 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY MIX 
The 107'h Congress, characterized during its first session by narrow 
Republican majorities in the House and Senate, delivered to President Bush 
"'Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 
1988), Appendix B. 
"U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security. 
"National Conference of State Legislatures, States Enacting New Crimes, Penalties Related to Terrorism-
August 20, 2002 Update, www.ncsl.org/programs/cj/terror. 
"U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security, p. 12. 
his initial successes of a major cut in income taxes and the first significant 
change in federal policy on K-12 education since 1965. The events of 11 
September prompted Congress to temporarily abandon its usual partisan 
deportment. As the general public and elected officials throughout the 
nation rallied around the president's call to defend the country against 
terrorists and "evildoers," his popularity soared. The quick ejection of the 
Tali ban regime in Afghanistan reinforced Bush's standing in public opinion 
polls. As the war against Al-Qaeda terrorism became a world-wide hunt, 
signs of progress became less obvious, and other events began to alter the 
political landscape. 
The post-September 11 period of "good will" was short-lived. In May 
2002, Senator James M. Jeffords (R-VT), in an act of dissatisfaction with 
Bush's positions on school choice, missile defense, the direction of the 
judiciary, and budget priorities, declared himself to be an Independent 
and began caucusing with the Democrats. Jeffords' switch in party allegiance 
gave majority rule in the Senate to the Democrats, thus ending the 
Republican party's lock on the main policymaking institutions in 
Washington, D.C. 
The collapse of Enron ushered in a wave of corporate scandals and 
bankruptcies that shocked investors and the stock market. The 
administration's lack of quick action against corporate "terrorists," compared 
to the speed of its action against the Taliban haifa world away, raised doubts 
about the competence of the president's economic team. Bush's personal 
and political ties to some discredited corporate executives resurrected 
charges that the Republicans are the party of big business. Democrats, 
however, could not gain much traction with this charge because many 
Democrats also had close ties to the same corporations. The public 
pressured Washington to arrest the CEOs and close the accounting and 
legal loopholes that made possible the looting of some firms. Bush, who 
campaigned for the presidency as a businessman, was forced to get tough 
on CEOs, some of whom had been his most important contributors.24 
The costs of the war against Al-Qaeda increased federal expenditures 
significantly. At the same time, the economy still struggling to recover from 
the collapse of the dot.com bubble caused a decline in federal revenues, as 
did the previously enacted tax cuts. The corporate scandals pushed the 
stock market down farther, threatening the Federal Reserve's efforts to boost 
the economy. Within the short span of a single year, the federal budget 
went from surpluses "as far as the eye could see" ($227 billion in July 2001) 
to burgeoning deficits ($192 billion in July 2002). 
Although the government in Washington was divided slimly along party 
lines, a fair amount of agreement was achieved across party lines in several 
policy areas. The president and Congress discovered that state governments 
24Howard Fineman and Michaellsikoff, "Laying Down The Law," Newsweek, 5 August 2002, pp. 20-23. 
had serious differences with the directions proposed for several federal 
policies. State challenges of Bush administration plans were especially 
troublesome because the dissenting voices were often Republican. 
Education 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 passed with overwhelming 
majorities in both chambers on 8 January 2002. During his presidential 
campaign Bush promised to make the education of every child his number-
one priority, and his basic strategy sought the adoption of performance 
testing in the nation's public schools. The reauthorization of the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) presented the 
administration with the opportunity to make good on the president's 
promise. Negotiating compromises with Senate Democrats, in particular 
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Bush achieved his first domestic victory 
since the Democrats gained their one-vote majority in the Senate. Not a 
mere reauthorization ofESEA, the new law transformed federal education 
policy from one of a broad-based distributive but supplemental program of 
federal dollars to a policy based on performance standards and backed up 
by penalties for failure to achieve the standards. The key provisions include: 
1. testing-establishes annual assessments for grades 3 through 8 in 
reading and mathematics, and authorizes $490 million in FY2002 
(and similar sums to FY2007) to aid states with the cost of testing; 
2. accountability-establishes Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) 
benchmarks which the states must reach with 100 percent 
proficiency in equal increments over 12 years; 
3. transferability-permits states and localities to use up to 50 percent 
of non-Title I monies for purposes they designate such as teacher 
training, bilingual education, after-school programs, and 
technology, and also grants parents the right to transfer their 
children out of failing schools to other public schools or receive 
federal aid for private tutoring; 
4. flexibility-gives seven states and 150 local education agencies a 
waiver from the U.S. Department of Education so that these 
jurisdictions may consolidate specified programs.25 
President Bush, in his comments after the two houses agreed to the final 
draft, stated: "The conference agreement will ensure that no child in America 
is left behind through historic education reforms based on real accountability, 
unprecedented flexibility for states and school districts, greater local control, 
more options for parents and more funding for what works."26 
25National Governors' Association, Policy Refmmce: Elnnentary and Secondary Education, www.nga.org/ 
nga/lobbyissues; The White House, Policies In Focus: Education Reform, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ 
education. 
"'Adam Clymer with Lizette Alvarez, "Congress Reaches Compromise on Education Bill," New lark 
TiJMS, 12 December 2001 (Netscape version). 
Not every one was pleased with the legislation. The Heritage Foundation 
called the measure a "mixed bag ... [of] small steps to reform," and stated 
that while the new law's provision to hold schools accountable for low test 
scores was a positive step, the right of parents to transfer their children was 
still inadequateP Some supporters of performance-based education were 
unsatisfied by the House Republicans' rejection of efforts to increase funding 
for special education from $6.3 billion to $21 billion over six years. The 
lack of additional funding for the growing costs of special education 
amounted to the federal government's turning away from its long-standing 
support for educational services to children with disabilities. Officials in a 
number of states were especially angered over the law's imposition of what 
some labeled as the "Texas model" of testing on all the states, even those 
with their own well-developed procedures. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) 
felt that the lack of discretion on the design of state testing systems would 
impose a cumbersome federal mandate that would override the successful 
testing program in his state. Hagel, one of three Republican votes against 
the legislation, lamented that "this bill federalizes our education system 
more than it's ever been federalized. I fail to see why the federal bureaucracy 
should override a state when a state has an accountable, workable testing 
system that, in fact, accomplishes the objective." Hagel was especially 
frustrated because he had managed to gain bipartisan Senate approval to 
fully fund the congressional commitment to meet the 40 percent of 
education services costs established in the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act.28 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is, in the White House's words, 
"the most sweeping reform of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
since it was enacted in 1965." In terms of its basic policy direction of 
performance-based education and in its 49 percent increase in funding 
over FY 2000, the new law is, without a doubt, a major revision of federal 
policy. The mandated single model for performance testing constitutes a 
direct order that has the potential to constrain state government discretion 
over how testing systems will be designed and operated. Some states, such 
as North Carolina, have testing procedures more sophisticated than the 
"Texas model," but under the new federal rules, they may not be able to 
retain them. Other states such as Kentucky test students across more subjects 
than reading and math, but different subjects are tested in different school 
years, so Kentucky may have to add what officials there see as unnecessary 
additional tests.29 
The future success of the new federal education policy hinges not just 
on the testing requirement, but also on the parental choice feature. If 
27lbid. 
28Don Walton, "Nelson, Hagel oppose ed bill," Lincoln journal-Star, 1 December 2001; 
wwwjournalstar.com/nebraska. 
29Richard Rothstein, "The Education Bill: Many Trials Ahead," New York Times, 19 December 
2001 (Netscape version). 
schools are found to be underperforming, but parents cannot find substitute 
schools into which to place their children, the new policy will be stymied. 
Upon passage of the final legislation, educators in many states expressed 
doubts about the viability of the school-choice option. Education officials 
in states as diverse as California, Massachusetts, and New York pointed out 
that their states already permit school choice, but in many metropolitan 
school districts, there are no empty spaces in many of the schools. If schools 
are overcrowded, the parental right to transfer is meaningless. In rural 
states such as Wyoming, "two-thirds of the schools," according to the 
legislative liaison for the state Department of Education, " are in 
communities where there is no choice."30 
For some, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris11 
has a greater potential for altering the nature of public schooling than the 
No Child Left Behind Act. The case pitted defenders of one of Thomas 
Jefferson's most important legacies and one of the civil institutions that has 
made America a pluralist nation against those who contend that public 
schools have failed in their obligation to educate all children, in particular, 
the poorest of the poor who are trapped in the worst of the inner city schools. 
Cleveland, Ohio, established a program giving low-income parents vouchers 
of $2,250 per child to move their children from sub-par inner city schools 
to private schools of the parents' choice, including private religious schools. 
The Court ruled that Cleveland's voucher program is constitutional because, 
on its face, it is neutral; the aid is designed to assist parents educate their 
children, the aid is not designed to assist a religion. The Wall Street journal 
was so elated by the Court ruling that it declared in an editorial "free at last, 
private school choice is free at last."32 
The Zelman ruling may be good news in those states where voucher 
experiments have been underway for some years and have had to contend 
with opposition based on the establishment clause of the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. However, the ruling may not be good news for 
voucher advocates for several reasons, some related to state laws and likely 
state action. First, the Supreme Court decision will run into a relic from the 
Know Nothing era of the 1850s. This period was the height of the hysteria 
against the newly arriving immigrant Irish, mostly Roman Catholic, and the 
Know Nothing party whipped up xenophobic sentiments in support oflaws 
to ban Catholics from-holding public office, dismiss Irish workers from state 
jobs, and to ensure that state dollars "shall never be appropriated to any 
religious sect for the maintenance exclusively of its own schools." In the 
1880s, James G. Blaine, a Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
campaigned for the presidency on a platform urging Congress to adopt a 
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constitutional amendment forbidding the use of tax dollars for religious 
schools. While the proposal never succeeded in Congress, many states did 
pass these so-called "Blaine amendments," and today thirty-seven states still 
have them in their constitution. Thus, the fight over vouchers will have to 
be carried to the state courts.33 Florida's court recently upheld that state's 
constitutional prohibition against vouchers.34 
Even if states move forward with vouchers, several questions will have to 
be answered before vouchers fulfill the promises made by their advocates. 
The Cleveland vouchers at $2,250 appear to be generous, but not many 
private schools set their tuition so low. One question is: will states 
appropriate enough money or tax credits to cover the average cost of private 
education, especially when states are suffering from fiscal stress? Second, 
as with the transferability feature in the new federal education law, if 
alternative private schools are not available, will vouchers be meaningless? 
Third, if vouchers become popular, will states without an income tax be 
forced to enact one in order to cover the additional costs of permitting 
some parents to exercise choice? Fourth, will vouchers designed to allow 
parents in the inner-city let their children escape under-performing schools 
provoke other parents to demand a broader system of direct financing based 
on tax credits? Fifth, will private schools that accept students bearing 
vouchers be required to meet a long list of regulations (e.g., non-
discrimination in hiring and public access to their records) not now applied 
to these schools? 
Welfare Reform 
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) was scheduled for re-authorization in 2002. A key 
component of the 1996 act was the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program, a new federal block grant that replaced the long-standing 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement. Enacted 
after a bitter partisan struggle, the law touted by President Clinton as the 
means "to end welfare as we know it" has been judged by most in Washington 
to have been a success. Isabel Sawhill of the Brookings Institution described 
the results of TANF with these words: "Almost all of the data is moving in 
the right direction: caseloads are down, employment up, poverty rates down, 
particularly among children and minority children."35 
TANF, compared to AFDC, imposed work requirements on welfare 
recipients and placed a 60-month lifetime limit on the period for which a 
family could receive cash assistance. States had to enforce the work 
requirements and time limits, and states also had to spend their own funds 
up to a level specified in federal policy [known as "maintenance of 
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effort"funds]. Furthermore, federal policy directed states to increase, on 
an annual basis, the percentage of TANF participants who work. A target 
of 50 percent of all welfare families was set, and states that did not achieve 
this target could be penalized with loss of federal funds. TANF did grant 
considerable administrative discretion to state governments in matters such 
as which families could be excluded from work requirements and time limits 
as well as what family assets would be included in the computation of a 
family's income. States also were allowed considerable flexibility over the 
types of services provided to TANF families. 
Bush's proposal for welfare re-authorization, entitled "Working Toward 
Independence," was announced on 26 February 2002. In essence, the plan 
would ratchet up the work requirements from 30 to 40 hours a week, raise 
the participation rate from 50 to 70 percent, phase out a case-load reduction 
requirement, continue funding at the current $4.6 billion, and re-program 
some of the money into two new funds intended to encourage new activities 
related to family formation, healthy marriages, and the reduction of out-of-
wedlock births. In keeping with public opinion favorable to increased 
assistance for children in poverty, Bush proposed that child well-being be 
the primary purpose of the re-authorized program, rather than its former 
goal of moving welfare recipients from dependency to self-sufficiency.36 
To the surprise of the White House, governors from both political parties 
strongly opposed the president's plan. The National Governors' Association 
(NGA), which had played an influential role in designing the I996 act, 
argued that the paramount focus of TANF ought to be on work, but that 
increasing the hourly work requirement for some families was unrealistic 
in a time of rising unemployment and a recessionary economy. Because 
many of the easiest persons to help had already left the welfare rolls, the 
governors demanded more discretion over what activities-job training, 
education, drug abuse treatment-would fulfill the work requirements. Many 
governors believed that the proposed increase in the participation rate would 
force states to place welfare recipients in "make work" jobs, often with public 
or non-profit organizations, rather than preparing people to qualify for 
private sector jobs.37 
Jesse Ventura, Minnesota's independent governor, issued a public 
statement in May 2002 that captured the governors' disappointment with 
the Bush administration's welfare-reform proposals: 
In 1996, the federal government ended 60 years of failed welfare policy 
that trapped families in dependency ... The 19961aw scrapped the federally 
centralized welfare system in favor of broad flexibility so states could come 
up with their own welfare programs. It was a move that had bipartisan 
support, was smart public policy and worked ... The reason is simple: state 
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flexibility ... But now the Bush administration is having second thoughts 
about empowering the states. The administration's proposal would return 
us to a federally prescribed system. It would impose rules on how states 
work with each family, forcing a "one size fits all" model for a system that 
for the past six years has produced individualized systems that have been 
successful in states across the country.38 
The debate between the governors and the White House gives the 
appearance of being fought out over money and programmatic details, but 
if one looks past the arguments over specific details, what one sees is a 
classic intergovernmental battle. Although legislative action on the re-
authorization ofTANF has yet to be completed, the bills in the House and 
the Senate contain most of the president's proposals. Despite a steady stream 
of gubernatorial testimony against Bush's position, the likelihood is that he 
will succeed in raising the performance bar on the administration ofTANF 
by the states. 
Health Care 
Once again, health care is the biggest policy headache for federal and 
state officials. A decade ago the Clinton administration's plan for reforming 
the health-care system failed to win public approval. In place of 
comprehensive reform, federal and state policymakers did support managed 
care approaches as a means to provide medical services broadly while 
controlling price increases. Although managed care temporarily slowed 
inflation in health-care costs, these costs are now rising at rate equivalent to 
those that provoked a crisis in the early 1990s. The Center for Studying 
Health System Change reports that "overall, health care spending per 
privately insured person increased 7.2 percent in 2000-the largest year-to-
year increase since 1990."39 The usual suspects are once again pushing up 
health costs. As a proportion of overall spending increases, hospital 
outpatient costs accounted for 31 percent, prescription drugs, 29 percent, 
and physicians, 28 percent.40 
Both private and public health programs are under severe fiscal strain. 
Health insurance premiums in 2001 rose 11 percent, the highest increase 
since 1993, and the projection for 2002 is 13 percent. The current year is 
the sixth year in a row in which health costs have climbed with the 
consequence that cost increases have been outrunning increases in 
insurance premiums, in some cases by as much as 30 percent. During the 
recent economic expansion, employers absorbed these increases, but with 
the current economic downturn, employers are beginning to pass these 
increases to employees. Similarly, self-employed persons find themselves 
receiving substantially higher health insurance bills, which has prompted 
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some families to enroll their children inS-CHIP, the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program that covers children in families with annual incomes of 
no more than twice the federal poverty level (approximately $34,000) .4' 
Medicaid, the nation's major health and long-term care program for the 
needy, covers more than 44 million people, is the largest federal grant 
program with about $207 billion outlays in FY 2000, and provides 42 percent 
of all federal dollars to the states. The program is administered by state 
governments which have discretion over several features of the health 
services provided. States payments for Medicaid expenditures combine state 
dollars with federal "matching" funds based on the state's per capita income 
compared to the national average for the preceding three years. Wealthier 
states receive a match of 50 percent, while the poorest states receive an 83 
percent match. In 2001, state Medicaid spending rose 10.6 percent, and 
estimates of the increase for 2002 put it at 13.3 percent.42 For 2002, state 
Medicaid outlays are almost 21 percent of total state spending, compared 
to 17.8 percent in 1992.43 These escalating expenditures have forced 47 
states to reduce them in 2002 or propose reductions for 2003. Examples of 
the actions taken or proposed include (1) reductions in drug costs, provider 
reimbursement rates, optional benefits, grants to rural hospitals, or 
eligibility, (2) increases in cost-sharing requirements, fraud and abuse efforts, 
or estate recovery, (3) contracting for services or multi-agency purchasing 
agreements, (4) implementing disease management, and (5) deferral of 
planned expansions or program enforcements. States are also moving to 
direct additional revenues toward Medicaid, including the reallocation of 
tobacco funds, increasing taxes on hospitals and cigarettes, initiating quality 
insurance fees on nursing homes, and drawing down the maximum 
permitted federal funds. 44 
Unlike the bipartisan support in Congress for President Bush's education 
and welfare proposals, there is a lack of agreement on how to solve the 
looming health-care crisis. The stunning defeat of the Clinton universal 
health care proposal makes even the most ardent advocates of this strategy 
reluctant to try again. Consequently, current policy proposals are incremental 
in nature. Bush, for example, has put forward several ideas, among the 
most widely discussed are $89 billion in tax credits to assist the uninsured 
purchase coverage, reform of medical malpractice insurance, tax exemptions 
for care givers, a patient bill of rights, and new funding of $190 billion to 
improve Medicare, which would include a prescription drug benefitY 
Bush also proposed to increase rebates to the states by adjusting the 
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formula for calculating the Medicaid drug rebate; this proposal would have 
saved about $9.5 billion over five years, but it died in Congress. Other parts 
of Bush's health-care reform plan worsen the states' Medicaid financial crisis 
by cutting approximately $9 billion dollars over five years. As unemployment 
has risen in recent months, more individuals qualify for Medicaid, thus 
driving up state expenditures. The National Governors' Association, along 
with the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (USCM), and the National Association of Counties 
(NACo), have objected to the administration's reduction in Medicaid 
matching funds. NCSL termed the administration's proposal to cap 
Medicaid expenditures as "fundamentally changing the relationship 
between the states and the federal government by inappropriately 
transforming a full partnership into a limited partnership, and shifting both 
costs and responsibilities to state governments."46 Officials representing 
state and local governments are supporting a bipartisan coalition in 
Congress, led by Senators Ben Nelson (D-NE) and Susan Clark (R-ME), 
which has introduced legislation to create a temporary increase in the 
Medicaid FMAP (Federal Medical Assistance Percentage) matching rate 
and hold harmless provision so no state would see its FMAP percentages 
reduced. The defeat of the prescription drug proposal before the August 
2002 recess reflects the general lack of consensus in Washington over how 
to solve the health-care crisis. 
Unfortunately, this deep division in the nation's capital leaves the states 
with no solution to the inexorable growth in health-care expenditures. Each 
political party holds fast to its preferred solution-the Republicans favor 
market mechanisms, while the Democrats prefer enlarging public programs. 
This standoff does nothing to address the runaway cost of prescription drugs 
which has increased at a whopping average rate of 19.7 percent in the last 
two yearsY States are not waiting for the gridlock in Washington to be 
broken; instead, over half the states have created or expanded their own 
programs to assist senior citizens pay for prescription drugs. For example, 
eight states have direct subsidy programs covering nearly three million 
people. Ten states are using tobacco-settlement money to pay part of the 
costs for prescription drugs. California and Florida passed laws limiting 
the prices pharmacies can charge senior citizens, while Michigan and 
Missouri enacted tax credits to help offset drug prices. Other states have 
set up buyers' clubs or purchasing cooperatives to help low-income elderly 
people gain discounts on drugs, and a few states are considering forming a 
group to jointly negotiate discounts from pharmaceutical companies.48 
These varied actions by the states to reduce the costs of prescription drugs 
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to the elderly offer a classic example of states performing their dual roles 
of "laboratories of democracy" and "workhorses of democracy." 
THE STATES 
As of 30 June 2002, there were 87,900 governmental jurisdictions in the 
United States, of which 87,849 were units of local government. The 50 
states encompass 38,971 general-purpose local governments, which include 
3,034 counties, 19,431 municipalities, and 16,036 townships. Special purpose 
governments number 48,878, of which 13,522 are school districts. Over 
the last 50 years, the number of counties has decreased by 18, townships 
have declined in number by four percent, while there are now 16 percent 
more municipal governments. The number of special purpose governments 
has changed substantially since 1952. Where once 67,355 school districts 
functioned, the count has dropped by 80 percent to 13,522. Special purpose 
governments have nearly tripled in number from 12,340 to 35,356. Almost 
91 percent of the non-school special districts perform a single function-
the most common of which are natural resources (19.9 percent), fire 
protection (16.2 percent), housing and community development (9.7 
percent), water supply (9.7 percent), and sewerage (5. 7 percent). Other 
functions include activities such as airports, cemeteries, highways, health, 
hospitals, libraries, parks and recreation, and other utilities.49 
In 1998-1999 state and local governments had revenues from their own 
sources of$1,163.4 billion, of which $815.3 billion were taxes (70 percent). 
The principal tax levies of state governments were the general sales tax 
(32.87 percent), individual income taxes (34.55 percent), selective sales 
taxes (15 percent), motor vehicle and other taxes (9.1 percent), and 
corporate income taxes (6.2 percent) .50 A variety of charges, miscellaneous 
general revenues, liquor store revenues, utility fees, and insurance trust 
revenues constituted the remainder of state government fiscal sources. It is 
noteworthy that the interest earnings of state governments ($32.1 billion) 
exceeded the amount levied on corporate incomes ($30.8 billion).51 By 
2001, state taxes grew to $559.8 billion, an increase of nearly 12 percent. 
The relative importance of the various types of taxes shifted in two important 
directions: (1) individual income taxes in 2001 increased to 37 percent of 
total state taxes, and (2) other state taxes declined-general sales taxes (32.1 
percent), selective sales taxes ( 14.1 percent), corporate income taxes (5. 7 
percent), and motor vehicle and other taxes (8.7 percent).52 
State government spending in 2000 on traditional functions continued 
to be substantial and widespread, as it had been through most of the 1990s. 
"U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, Governments In 
2002, Census of Governments 2002, GC02-l (P),July 2002. 
""The percentages were computed as a proportion of total state taxes of$499.94 billion. 
"U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, Stale and Local 
Government Finances by Level of Government and by State, 1998-1999. 
52U .S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, United States State 
Govnnment Tax Collections: 2001, www. census.gov/govs/www/statetaXOI. 
Education accounted for $346.8 billion (31.9 percent), public welfare 
consumed $239.0 billion (22.04 percent), health and hospitals required 
$74.6 billion (6.87 percent), and highways cost $74.2 billion (6.84 percent) .53 
The national economic expansion following the recession in 1991-1992 
allowed state governments to increase their spending by 28 percent, after 
adjusting for inflation and population growth. From 1990 to 1999, 39 states 
increased expenditures by 25 percent or more. 54 The economic boom not 
only sustained the rising spending, but it also permitted states to roll back 
taxes by nearly $36 billion. 55 
An unusual convergence of events, some would say good luck, made it 
possible for state governments to increase real spending and decrease taxes. 
The economy rebounded after the financial services recession of the early 
1990s on a wave of growing worker productivity and the explosion in 
information technology, telecommunications, and "dot.com" businesses. 
State revenues advanced in real terms as taxable incomes grew even faster 
than the economy. At the same time, states benefitted from the federal 
government's action to reform welfare by converting the AFDC entitlement 
to the TANF block grant. Efforts to contain health-care costs using managed 
care approaches yielded some savings as did a temporary drop in the pace 
of Medicaid enrollment. Topping off this good fortune for the states was 
the tobacco settlement with its windfall of $264 billion over 25 years. 56 
Red Ink Floods the States 
In February 2001, the Cato Institute described state governments as in 
" ... the midst of the longest sustained run of net state tax cutting in American 
history,"57 but by January 2002, 46 states had revenues below projections, 
30 states had expenditures over budget, 39 states had enacted budget cuts 
or rollbacks, 26 had dipped into their reserves, and 30 states used various 
other measures to balance budgets that had become flooded with red ink. 58 
Seldom has fiscal growth been followed so swiftly by fiscal decline. In March 
2002, the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) estimated 
the budget shortfalls for the current fiscal year to be close to $40 billion, or 
7.8 percent of estimated total general-fund revenues. 59 By April 2002, the 
National Conference of State Legislatures reported that "at least 40 states 
and the District of Columbia were being forced this year to make emergency 
cuts in their budgets totaling $27 billion."60 By July 2002, the National 
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Governors' Association reported that 45 states had revenue shortfalls over 
last year totaling $50 billion.61 
Projected FY 2002 shortfalls were estimated to range from $12 million 
in South Dakota to $4.5 billion in California. As a percentage of FY 2000 
general fund expenditures, 2002 projected shortfalls ranged from a low of 
0.4 percent in New Mexico to a high of 28.3 percent in Alaska.62 One 
report had California's budget deficit at $23.6 billion, or one-third of the 
state's entire budget.63 State governments responded to the budget-busting 
"deficit deluge" with standard short-term measures and "creative 
accounting." Spending cuts targeted higher education, aid to local 
governments, parks, prisons, and K-12 funds. "Rainy day" reserves were 
drawn down, trust funds were swept into the general fund, and debt 
financing using bonds was substituted for "pay-as-you-go" financing of 
capital projects. States desperate to balance their budgets resorted to 
bookkeeping gimmicks and ruses such as artificially inflating revenue 
estimates, delaying payments of already appropriated funds, budgeting 
appropriations at a level below forecasts, and delaying or suspending tax 
refunds.64 
As expected, most of the effort to balance state budgets has fallen on the 
expenditure side of the ledger. Some states, however, have been willing to 
raise taxes, typically cigarette and other sin taxes. Many states are increasing 
the fees charged for services ranging from state park entrance fees to motor 
vehicle licenses to college tuition. Other states have rolled back some 
portion of recently enacted tax cuts or tax rebates. Ironically, many state 
officials who supported the national effort to abolish estate taxes have voted 
to preserve their state's inheritance tax.65 The tobacco-settlement money 
in some states has been "securitized" in order to produce short-term 
revenues. "Securitization" is a technique by which a state government sells 
bonds that give investors a claim on future installments of the state's tobacco-
settlement funds in return for a lower, one-time payment that can be used 
immediately by the state government. As of june 2002, 12 states had adopted 
this extreme form of deficit financing. 66 
Budget cuts, closure of public facilities, increased taxes, and various 
accounting gimmicks have not dammed the tide of red ink. Arturo Perez, 
a NCSL policy analyst, stated that the situation in Tennessee was described 
to him as: "We cut the fat in the first year. We cut to the bone last year. And 
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what we are going to do this year is kind ofunanswered."67 Forecasts for FY 
2003 project even more red ink. 
Causes of the State Fiscal Crisis 
Less than two years ago, governors and state legislators contemplated 
the joys of tax relief, but now state officials face the pain of paying bills 
without sufficient funds. How could this fiscal crisis emerge so quickly and 
apparently with little warning? Don Boyd, Director, Fiscal Studies Program, 
Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, points to the stock market 
decline as "the number one culprit."68 Each year of"irrational exuberance" 
in the stock market drove the proportion of state income taxes derived 
from capital gains and stock options higher and higher, but in 2001 this 
revenue source dropped precipitously-in some cases as much as 36 percent. 
Unlike other recent economic downturns, 2001 was especially abrupt, thus 
bursting the states' revenue bubble. 69 
Terrorism also contributed to the burgeoning fiscal crisis. Because 
decisions about what to protect and how to do it are still being made, it is 
nearly impossible to estimate state and local costs for improved security. 
Some early numbers are instructive. A January 2002 survey conducted by 
the U.S. Conference of Mayors found that city officials expected to spend 
an additional $2.6 billion on security between 11 September 2001 and the 
end of2002. These costs are over and above expected and planned security 
spending, with the per city average of extra security costs estimated at $1.84 
million. "Tightening security in the aftermath of September 11 threatens 
to break the bank for many city budgets," New Orleans Mayor Marc Moria!, 
the USCM president, stated.70 Although federal funds were approved, but 
not yet delivered, to help states and localities with security costs, nevertheless, 
the general slowdown in several sectors of the economy following the attacks 
resulted in reduced revenues. From 1 October 2000 to 31 March 2002, 
municipal sales taxes were 3 percent below projections, tourist taxes 9 
percent below, and income taxes 10 percent below. The only good news 
was that property taxes in 2001 were up 5 percent over 2000.71 
Rapidly rising health-care costs, especially for Medicaid, contributed 
strongly to the states' fiscal woes. One in seven Americans is covered by 
Medicaid which pays for, among other items, 40 percent of births and 50 
percent of nursing home bills. Although federal dollars cover on average 
57 percent of state costs, state spending is accelerating into double-digit 
annual increases-13 percent in 2001.72 Medicaid accounts for an average 
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of 20 percent of state budgets, and the return of unrestrained inflation in 
health care means that Medicaid and other health expenditures wiii 
continue to grow faster than state revenues. 73 With few signs of additional 
aid from Washington, D.C., Medicaid expenditures threaten to swallow up 
monies from other fundamental state functions such as higher education, 
transportation, and aid to local governments. 74 
A longer list of other pressures on state budgets would also include smaller 
returns on state pension investments, lower payouts of tobacco-settlement 
money due to a decline in the consumption of cigarettes, and the four-fold 
increase in criminaljustice expenditures since 1980. But one of the most 
frustrating sources of fiscal problems as far as state officials are concerned 
are federal policy actions as well as inaction by the president and Congress 
on matters important to the states. In particular, the phase-out of the federal 
estate tax and the immediate federal tax deduction for new equipment 
purchases have the potential to force states to forego billions of dollars of 
revenue in the near future. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 
2001 included a repeal of the federal estate tax by 2010, but the state tax 
credit to which state inheritance taxes are linked will be eliminated by 2005.75 
The potential revenue loss has been estimated at approximately $21 billion, 
and every state but Oklahoma could be affected. Instead of the previous 
practice of allowing businesses to depreciate capital purchases over several 
years, the 2001 economic stimulus legislation granted businesses an 
immediate deduction of up to 30 percent. Similar to the federal-state tie 
between the estate tax credit and state inheritance taxes, states have used 
federal depreciation rules as part of state business-tax calculations. 
Consequently, the change in federal depreciation policy will force states to 
also give business this "instant" deduction, and thus states will lose revenue. 
The good news is that it is possible for states to avoid these losses by passing 
legislation that "decouples" their tax systems from these specific federal 
changes. About a dozen states have already acted to do so. 76 
The states themselves have contributed to the fiscal pain they are 
suffering, principally through the reduction of state taxes. Into 2001, when 
the effects of the stock market downturn were already evident, states 
continued to enact tax cuts. The Great Lakes states, for example, passed 
large tax cuts totaling almost $1.8 billion, and the cuts caused a decline in 
state revenue collections for FY 2001. 77 In 2001, Wisconsin reduced its 
revenues by 5.1 percent; Delaware, Maine, and Minnesota lowered revenues 
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by over 3 percent; New York decreased revenues by almost $1 billion; and 
California trimmed revenues by a little over $1 billion. 
At a more fundamental level, the states have yet to address the primary 
structural weaknesses in their budgets. The first structural weakness is on 
the demand side. Health-care costs, as noted previously, are growing faster 
than revenues, and now consume, if one includes all state health-care 
expenditures, almost 30 percent of state budgets. If the aging of the 
population is driving up health-care costs, then the "baby boom echo" 
combined with immigration, legal and illegal, is pushing up education costs. 
States cannot expect Washington, D.C., to rescue them from the relentless 
demand for education and health care, so the states have to tackle the second 
structural problem, which is on the supply side. The long-term shift of the 
economy from manufacturing to services has left state revenue structures 
collecting monies from a deteriorating base. The exemption of goods and 
services purchased via electronic commerce only exacerbates this weakness. 
Reform of state revenues will not be easy in the current political-economic 
climate. 
Federalism Without Washington 
States, singly or in combination, can choose to pursue policies different 
from that of the federal government. It is common for one or more states 
to take the initiative on some issue or problem, and for state action to become 
the precursor of federal action. The most compelling example in recent 
years is the agreement reached by 40 states with the tobacco industry. 78 
Daniel J. Elazar called this type of state government policy activity 
"federalism without Washington," which he described as " ... unnoticed in 
discussion of the place of the states in the federal system is the growing 
routinization of interstate relationships that are not routed through 
Washington and that act as a counterbalance to federal activity."79 
Interstate activism has been on the upswing,80 and this year states pushed 
forward on several policy fronts, some of which directly challenge the federal 
government. The states have been especially assertive in three policy areas 
all related to their relationships with the corporate world: (1) actions 
prompted by losses states suffered in the stock market, (2) battles over energy 
policy, and (3) the federal government's continued push to deregulate. 
Each of these policy areas has prompted several states to take new and often 
surprisingly strong stands. 
During the past year, public pension funds have lost more than $1 billion 
because of corporate malfeasance. The nation's largest pension fund, the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers), lost $565 million 
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on the collapse of Worldcom 's stock. The losses in other states' pension 
funds are equally staggering: New York-$300 million; Wisconsin-$36.3 
million; Michigan-$116 million; Iowa-$33 million. These losses are in 
addition to previous-year losses. The total amount that vanished from public 
pension funds from january 2000 to june 2002 has been estimated at $370 
billion, or 14 percent offund assets.81 
Given these figures, it is hardly a surprise that numerous states have gone 
to court not just to recoup their losses, but also to change the rules governing 
corporate behavior. Michael L. Fitzgerald, the Iowa treasurer, called the 
situation "a crisis." He went on to say: ''I'm outraged. We have invested in 
the American marketplace and we have lost confidence. There is now no 
trust in people who are running these businesses. No trust in them at all. 
Institutional investors need to pick up the mantle oflitigation. Who's watching 
these guys at the top? They are proving to be bald-faced liars." Tom Herndon, 
the executive director of the Florida State Board of Administration, stated, 
"The time is over for the chief executive to sit in his multimillion-dollar 
mansion in Aspen and laugh at all the shareholders who have lost their life 
savings. These people ought to be punished, and the institutional investors 
ought to be one of the parties to take up the cry." Given these sentiments, it 
is no surprise that Florida's pension fund has filed over 200 lawsuits against 
Enron, Alliance Capital, and several Wall Street firms. 82 
Officials in California, New York, and North Carolina went so far as to 
announce that they would start withholding business from Wall Street firms 
that do not make changes to limit conflict of interest between their activities 
in investment banking and stock analysis. Firms that agree to the changes 
will be allowed to compete for various financial actions such as bond sales 
conducted by these states. "Those who don't will go into the penalty box," 
stated Philip Angleides, the treasurer of California.83 
Another area of interstate activism is the movement by state governments 
to counteract the continuing deregulation trend by Washington. The Bush 
administration's plans to loosen federal regulations in policy areas such as 
antitrust, banking, appliance efficiency, consumer safety, energy, 
environment, health care, and telecommunications have prompted 
numerous states to express their opposition by going to court. State officials 
see federal deregulation as undercutting state statutes and rules that are 
more stringent than new federal ones. The current round of state lawsuits 
is not unlike the one that occurred during the Reagan administration when 
efforts to relax federal rules prompted state attorneys general to band 
together to try to stop Washington's deregulatory activity.84 
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A particularly long-running and bitter feud has developed between 
California and the Bush administration over several interrelated policies: 
electricity, energy, global warming, and air pollution. In each of these policy 
areas, California has adopted stances at odds with Washington. California's 
dissatisfaction with decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) on electricity deregulation continues to fester. 85 FERC and 
California spent the last year dueling over details such as the time period 
that power sales transactions should be subject to refunds because of 
overcharging as well as the duration of the temporary price restraints FERC 
imposed in June 2001. The uncovering of company documents 
demonstrating that the Enron corporation had gamed the electricity market 
during the power crisis of2000 and 2001 exacerbated the tension between 
California and FERC, and the state increased pressure on FERC to open an 
inquiry into what actually transpired in the energy market. The "smoking 
gun" internal memos undercut the commission's earlier position on the 
virtues of the free market, and forced FERC to reverse course. The 
commission ordered nearly 150 power marketers, independent electricity 
generators, and energy traders to turn over a long list of company 
documents so that FERC could launch an investigation into the full extent 
of electricity price manipulation.86 Once the damaging memos became 
public, other states joined California's campaign against Enron. 
California's troubles with federal electricity deregulation were not its 
only differences with the Bush administration. California's Democratic 
governor, along with Democratic officials in ten other states, attacked Bush's 
decision not to act to limit "greenhouse gas" emissions. One motive behind 
this maneuver was the opportunity to score political points after new studies 
again demonstrated the reality of global warming. But California's challenge 
of federal environmental policy also has roots in the size and strength of 
the environmental interest groups in the state that have made California 
the "center of the environmental regulatory universe," according to a 
spokesperson from General Motors. 87 Environmentalists have been 
frustrated for years by their inability to pass federal legislation to increase 
fuel standards and to control automobile emissions. A bipartisan coalition 
of primarily midwestern members of Congress has blocked pro-environment 
initiatives; consequently, environmental groups targeted the nation's largest 
automobile market for a lobbying campaign to require new reductions in 
tailpipe emissions for cars and light trucks (including the highly popular 
sport utility vehicles). Success on this proposal prompted Governor Gray 
Davis and other officials to pressure the president on global warming. 
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Four features of this current round of state-federal scuffling over 
regulatory policy are important to note. First, a number of the changes in 
federal regulations are the result of changes enacted by Congress, a good 
example is the 1999 Financial Modernization Act.88 Second, some state 
action reflects dissatisfaction with federal inaction in a policy area. An 
example is telemarketing where at least seven states have passed "Do Not 
Call" laws that "require telephone solicitors to avoid calling consumers who 
list their objections to such calls on a registry."89 Third, state action to fill 
perceived voids in federal policy is not partisan; both Democratic and 
Republican officials are engaged in lawsuits against the federal government. 
Fourth, some federal officials have reached out to the states, but the general 
perception by state officials is that too few have.90 
An important consequence of this current battle over regulatory policy 
is a shift by national interest groups to lobby in state capitals. The American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), for example, recently completed 
building a network of 50 state offices to facilitate its lobbying activities in 
every state.91 Lobbyists registered in state capitals are so numerous that a 
recent study computed a ratio of five lobbyists to every state legislator. This 
same study found that in 2000, spending by registered lobbying groups in 
34 states totaled $570 million, an increase of 91 percent from 1995.92 
State-federal tension, of course, is a normal feature of American 
federalism. So also is state government use of "police powers" to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of citizens and to exercise state authority to 
regulate intrastate commerce and some aspects of interstate commerce. 
State government activism aimed at corporate malfeasance is not new; after 
all, state governments were in the forefront of the Populist battles with 
railroads and banks during the late 1800s. But today's increased interstate 
activism derives from an important intergovernmental shift in where private 
enterprise seeks to gain advantage. For much of the twentieth century, 
business groups opposed federal government regulation in part because 
businesses could more easily influence state government actions. The rise 
of consumer protection and environmental interest groups challenged 
private enterprise's dominance in the states, and these groups were able to 
transform state laws and regulations so that in many instances state standards 
exceeded federal ones. During the 1990s, many corporations and industries 
decided that a single national standard was preferable to 50 different state 
standards, and so reversed their stance on federal regulation in an effort to 
constrain state regulatory actions. Consequently, many state governments 
find themselves being urged by their residents to challenge federal policy 
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in areas as diverse as bank customer privacy, global warming, patent rights 
related to generic drugs, and predatory lending. State officials are being 
pressured by their constituents to use "police powers" to protect citizens by 
imposing regulations tougher than federal ones. Globalization of economic 
competition and the development of technologies that make possible nearly 
instantaneous transmission of commercial activity add to the 
intergovernmental tension over regulatory policy. The legitimate use of state 
"police power" clashes with the necessity of business to operate within a global 
marketplace characterized by reasonably uniform rules, some of which 
originate in international bodies such as the World Trade Organization.93 
The matrix of American federalism facilitates shifts in the locus of interest 
group activity with its consequent impact on the nature of public policy. 
This intergovernmental movement also can change the character of each 
state's policy interests and its stance toward federal policy. Efforts to provide 
industries with economies of scale by establishing a single national standard 
for a particular activity or product are not new, as the long campaign to 
adopt a single standard for buildings and construction attests. However as 
the campaign for uniform building codes also demonstrates, state (and 
local) governments will insist on pursuing what they perceive as their own 
best interest. Today's high level of interstate activism may not be a 
particularly well routinized form of "federalism without Washington," but 
it certainly is the "counterbalance to federal activity" that Elazar anticipated 
in his explanation of this feature of American federalism. 
CONCLUSION 
In November and December 2000, U.S. federalism suffered through a 
protracted, extra innings contest to determine the forty-third president. 
While the bitter battle over the legality of certain ballots in the state of 
Florida was certainly harmful to the electoral process and to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, nevertheless, it did not destroy the electoral process nor 
did it undermine the legitimacy of the new administration. But few knew 
that this political shock to American government would be followed soon 
afterward by a more terrible one to the whole of society. The 11 September 
2001 terrorist attack on two symbols of American power-the Pentagon and 
the World Trade Center-thrust the country into an unwanted war with a 
distant and not well understood foe. The scramble to organize a response 
against a loose coalition of individuals with sufficient resources to commit 
mayhem resulted in a remarkable outpouring of patriotism as well as a new 
realization that government-national, state, and local-does provide solutions 
to many types of problems. Where once presidential candidates derided 
government as the problem, citizens suddenly saw the benefits of 
government in the form of firefighters, police officers, rescue teams, and 
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public health specialists. From the "first responders" at "Ground Zero," to 
the National Guard standing watch at vital facilities such as water treatment 
plants, to the president and Congress uniting, if only temporarily, to devise 
and execute national plans for homeland security, all elements of the 
American federal system not only survived the attack, but demonstrated 
the capacity and energy the system can marshal in a time of urgency. 
